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Stakeholder Power and Organizational Learning  
in Corporate Environmental Management1 
 
Abstract 
The literatures on stakeholder engagement by companies and organizational learning give 
little consideration to the power (or influence) of stakeholders to affect the process or content 
of organizational learning. These literatures generally assume that common ground between 
companies and their stakeholders can be established as a prerequisite for learning, that 
learning is a quasi-autonomous process unaffected by the motives or power of stakeholders, 
and that actors have the power to fulfil roles that are critical in fostering learning. The paper 
seeks to address these omissions, examining how and why stakeholder power and 
organizational learning interact, drawing on comparative case studies of the environmental 
management practices found in two major companies. The evidence from these cases suggests 
a complex relationship between the ambition of company goals, the structure of learning, and 
the influence of stakeholders on the process and outcomes of learning. Exploitative learning 
routines were effective when stakeholder influences converged, whereas explorative learning 
took place without convergence but the implementation of this learning was hampered. We 
suggest that this raises important issues for companies that seek to undertake both exploitative 
and explorative learning and that future studies of organizational learning should take more 
explicit account of the effects of stakeholder power. 
 
Key words: Environmental Management, Stakeholders, Power and influence, Organizational 
Learning 
                                                 
1 We are indebted to Anja de Groene for data collection and to the constructively critical comments of Richard 
Nielsen and three anonymous Organization Studies reviewers. 
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Stakeholder Power and Organizational Learning 
in Corporate Environmental Management 
 
 
Organization scholars are increasingly interested in the means by which organizations learn 
and adapt. Organizational learning addresses ways in which information processing affects 
the behavioural capacities of organizations (Argote 1999; Huber 1991; Miner and Mezias 
1996), while the resource-based view of the firm focuses on the competitive advantages 
obtained through learnt capabilities that are hard to imitate (Barney 1991, 2001; Hart 1995). 
These perspectives highlight the benefits of organizational knowledge; yet, they often ignore 
the effects of the distribution of power between stakeholders on organizational learning.  It is 
assumed that stakeholders or actors willingly cooperate to advance the state of organizational 
knowledge (Clegg 1989; Contu and Willmott 2003; Coopey 1996; Perrow 1986; Phillips et al. 
2000; Romme 1999), leading to the notion that organizations only need to have the right 
mechanisms in place in order to learn.  Power is not seen to affect learning and performance.  
Our study addresses the issue of power in relation to organizational learning. We focus 
on the relationship between the power of stakeholders and types of learning, learning 
processes, and learning roles. And we consider how and why these relationships arise in the 
corporate environmental management practices in two companies.  
Freeman (1984: 46) defines a stakeholder as “any group or individual who can affect or 
is affected by the achievement of an organization’s objectives”. We use a more restrictive 
definition of stakeholders as “individuals or groups who significantly affect an organization’s 
behaviour” (cf. the ‘Stanford definition’ in Mitchell et al. 1997). This definition implies that 
organizations have internal stakeholders as well as actors from outside constituencies acting 
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alone or in constellations. Stakeholder influence occurs when a stakeholder makes another 
actor behave in ways that (s)he would not otherwise do (Dahl 1957). We share Mintzberg’s 
(1983) view that influence is the equivalent of power, as power that is not exercised is 
insignificant, and influence is a materialization of power. We studied the influence exerted by 
stakeholders on learning by business organizations in the context of corporate environmental 
management. The term environment as used in the paper refers to the natural resources 
context within which companies operate (Egri and Pinfield 1996), unless it is preceded by 
adjectives such as ‘social’ or ‘business’. Corporate environmental management concerns the 
ways companies deal with issues raised by this natural-resources context (Gladwin 1993). 
Organizational learning occurs when companies increase their behavioural capacities as a 
consequence of information processing (Huber 1991; Kim 1993).  
Our theoretical framework is grounded in the literature on multi-stakeholder 
cooperation and organizational learning, which we extend by drawing on the literature about 
power and influence. Our empirical analysis focuses on two companies identified by external 
stakeholders as environmentally proactive. These companies were otherwise different in 
terms of their sector of operation, their external stakeholders, and their corporate 
environmental management practices. This implied the possibility to observe different ways 
of learning.   
The paper has five sections.  First, we present and discuss theoretical ideas about multi-
stakeholder cooperation and organizational learning. This highlights the failure of this 
literature to take much account of power and its effects on learning. Second, we outline the 
empirical methods used in our two case studies. In the third section, we describe the two case 
companies, the ambition of their corporate environmental management practices, their 
management structures and learning routines, and their main internal and external 
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stakeholders. The evidence from the two cases is compared and related to the literature. 
Finally, we draw conclusions and provide suggestions for further research. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
The corporate environmental management literature spans organizational strategies (Hall and 
Roome 1996; Hoffman 1997; Kolk and Mauser 2002; Roome 1992), reporting and auditing 
(Ball et al. 2000; Gray et al. 1993), management systems (Kolk 2000; Spencer-Cooke 1998), 
marketing (Elkington 1998; Elkington and Burke 1989; Prakash 2000), corporate 
relationships with regulators, non-governmental organizations, and other stakeholders (Carroll 
1996; Hoffman 1997; Stead and Stead 2000; Turcotte and Pasquero 2001), supply chain 
management (Hart 1995; Wycherley 1999), and research and development (Roome 1994). In 
the past decade, significant changes have taken place in business practices in these areas. In 
all these areas, high performance involves organizational learning to process new information, 
to improve internal structures and approaches, to develop new products, and to adapt the 
organization to (changing) contexts.  
The literature on organizational learning deals with types of learning (Argyris and 
Schön 1978, 1996; March 1991; Weick and Westley 1996), learning processes (Argote 1999; 
Huber 1991; Kim 1993), learning curves (Argote 1999), learning paths (Cohen and Levinthal 
1990; Cyert and March 1992; Levitt and March 1995; Nelson and Winter 1982), group 
composition (Argote 1999; Weick and Westley 1996), and learning roles (Nonaka 1996; 
Senge 1999; Tushman and Nadler 1996). The specific elements of theory we use to frame our 
discussion of environment-related organizational learning are: environmental stakeholder 
engagement and integration that provide learning spaces in relation to types of organizational 
learning, learning processes, and roles that support learning. 
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Multi-Stakeholder Cooperation and Learning Spaces 
The systemic character of corporate environmental management has been described, which 
involves knowledge and ideas from a variety of actors in and beyond business organizations 
(Roome 1994). For example, developing a new product with fewer environmental burdens 
involves different internal departments (purchasing, production, marketing, and research and 
development), as well as external constituencies (suppliers, customers, and regulators) and 
environmental interests. Hart (1995) suggests that the concept of product stewardship (i.e., 
assumed responsibility for products throughout the product chain) involves companies 
working across the links in the product chain.  
Corporate environmental management calls for interaction between actors to resolve 
different perspectives on issues, options, and their outcomes, and to make choices. This 
notion is not new. Chevalier and Cartwright (1966) describe environmental issues as meta-
problems (i.e., interconnected problem sets), where responses to any issue in the set generally 
affect the set as a whole. Solutions, therefore, need to be devised that address the problem set 
as a whole and involves multi-actor cooperation designed to assess problems, find solutions, 
and evaluate outcomes (Glasbergen 1998; Gray 1989; Hajer 1996; Roome 1994; Turcotte and 
Pasquero 2001; Westley and Vredenburg 1991). Cooperation of this kind is seen as  “socially 
contrived mechanisms for collective action” (Hardy and Phillips 1998: 222). Not surprisingly, 
engagement between companies and other actors [stakeholders] has become an important 
theme in corporate environmental management literature and practice (De Bruijn and Tukker 
2002; Hart 1995; Roome 1994; Sharma and Vredenburg 1998). It is argued that ‘stakeholder 
engagement’ is important for companies to establish social legitimacy (Hoffman 1997; Oliver 
1990; Westley and Vredenburg 1991), undertake joint action (Clarke and Roome 1999; De 
                                                              
 6
Bruijn and Tukker 2002; Stafford et al. 2000), and for learning by firms and their partners 
(Roome 1994; Sharma and Vredenburg 1998; Turcotte and Pasquero 2001).   
Organizational capabilities that foster cooperation and environmental learning are a 
critical part of stakeholder engagement (Clarke and Roome 1999). Hart (1995) argues that the 
ability to integrate inputs from stakeholders is based on previously learnt skills. Clarke and 
Roome (1999) suggest that learning and action from multi-stakeholder engagement is 
influenced by a more complex mix of factors, including organizational antecedents, market 
positioning, technology, access to stakeholder networks, sensitivity to multiple perspectives, 
and ability to facilitate inputs from different internal and external stakeholders. 
While some compatibility of stakeholders’ objectives is seen as a basis for agreement or 
consensus on action (Oliver 1990; Phillips et al. 2000), in practice, stakeholders often have 
divergent interests and objectives (Heugens 2003). Indeed, behavioural theory has long held 
that organizations consist of multiple parties with conflicting interests (Cohen et al. 1979; 
Cyert and March 1992; Hickson et al. 1986; Mintzberg 1983; Schein 1996) and that actors 
with similar interests form coalitions. In the same way, external stakeholders may adopt an 
antagonistic attitude on the basis of divergent interests (Hardy and Phillips 1998; Pfeffer and 
Salancik 1978). When clashes of interest arise and continue, problems cannot be solved 
unambiguously. While the very existence of organizations suggests that working together has 
an added value that exceeds the negative effects arising from conflicts of interest, these 
negative effects can undermine organizational effectiveness (Clegg 1989; Perrow 1986). The 
literature on multi-stakeholder cooperation and learning does not address how common 
ground between companies and stakeholders is established. 
 





Types of learning 
Two different types of learning are commonly discussed in the literature. At one extreme, 
exploitative learning (March 1991) is the acquisition of new behavioural capacities framed 
within existing insights. An example is the fine-tuning of existing technology in oil refinery 
installations to reduce air emissions. Exploitative learning is described in the literature as 
‘single-loop’ (Argyris and Schön 1978, 1996), ‘adaptive’ (Senge 1990), ‘operational’ 
(Coopey 1996), ‘first-order’ (Fox-Wolfgramm et al. 1998), ‘evolutionary’, ‘frame-taking’, 
‘reactive’ (Weick and Westley 1996), and ‘incremental’ (Miner and Mezias 1996). 
At the other extreme, explorative learning (March 1991) occurs when organizations 
acquire behavioural capacities that differ fundamentally from existing insights. Exploration is 
about discovery, variation, effectiveness, flexibility, and innovation (March 1991; Weick and 
Westley 1996). An example is the conception of a new plant using design principles that aim 
to reduce pollution at source. This type of learning is referred to under labels such as ‘double-
loop’ (Argyris and Schön 1978, 1996), ‘generative’ (Senge 1990), ‘strategic’ (Coopey 1996), 
‘second-order’ (Fox-Wolfgramm et al. 1998), ‘revolutionary’, ‘frame-breaking’, ‘proactive’ 
(Weick and Westley 1996), and ‘radical’ (Miner and Mezias 1996). 
Different (organizational) structures are conducive to different types of learning. 
Mechanistic structures with tightly coupled relationships between actors foster exploitative 
learning in stable contexts, while organic structures with loosely coupled relationships are 
favourable to the occurrence of explorative learning in changing contexts (Burns and Stalker 
1961; Hansen et al. 2001; Rowley et al. 2000; Weick and Westley 1996).  
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Learning processes 
Stages in the process of organizational learning are discussed in the literature. Kim (1993) and 
Morgan (1997) describe learning as the acquisition, interpretation, and implementation of new 
knowledge, whereas Huber (1991) identifies the acquisition, dissemination, interpretation, 
and storage of new knowledge. We adopt Argote’s (1999) view that organizational learning 
involves three stages: acquisition, sharing, and storage.  Interpretation is not seen as a discrete 
stage but more as an activity arising throughout the learning process. Furthermore, 
implementation is not a necessary element of the process, as learning refers to the evolution of 
cognitive capacities, which may or may not lead to action.  
Organizations acquire information in different ways: through ‘experiential learning’ 
(Huber 1991), ‘learning by doing’ (Argote 1999; Levitt and March 1995), or ‘trial-and-error 
learning’ (Miner and Mezias 1996).  New knowledge can be created through experiments or 
introspection (Miner and Mezias 1996). Organizations also learn ‘vicariously’ by picking up 
information from external sources (Huber 1991; Miner and Mezias 1996), for example, by 
adopting technical solutions practised by competitors or advised by regulators. Frequent 
repetition of activities leads to acquisition of tacit knowledge. 
Information is often filtered in search processes because available information exceeds 
the information processing capacity of the firm, leading to ‘satisficing behaviour’ rather than 
the pursuit of comprehensive solutions to problems based on full knowledge of issues, 
options, and outcomes (Bazerman 1997; Lindblom 1959; Simon 1976, 1991).  
Sharing information serves two purposes. Individuals or departments need information 
acquired by others (Simon 1973) to help formulate responses to problems that affect the larger 
organization. This is more necessary for the systemic issues, which characterize corporate 
environmental management. Second, local knowledge, relevant or adaptable to other settings, 
does not have to be reinvented (Von Hippel 1994). Information and knowledge can be shared 
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through face-to-face communication, with the aid of technology (Argote 1999; Nonaka 1996; 
Romme and Dillen 1997), or through the distribution of documents (Argote 1999; Romme 
and Dillen 1997). Knowledge is also embodied in technology (Argote 1999), in physical and 
organizational structures (Argote 1999; Romme and Dillen 1997), or routines (as repetitive 
patterns of activity) (Cohen and Bacdayan 1996; Nelson and Winter 1982; Romme and Dillen 
1997; Weick and Westley 1996). 
New information is stored in personal memory (Argote 1999; Huber 1991; Nelson and 
Winter 1982; Simon 1991), documentation (Levitt and March 1996), technological appliances 
(Argote 1999; Huber 1991; Levitt and March 1996), embodied in physical or organizational 
structures (Argote 1999; Levitt and March 1996), or routines, which constitute standardized 
operational solutions (Argote 1999; Cohen and Bacdayan 1996; Huber 1991; Levitt and 
March 1996; Nelson and Winter 1982).   
The reasons why actors do not share information include the time taken for 
communication that could be devoted to other tasks (Hansen et al. 2001) and the loss of 
valuable resources through sharing (Argote 1999; Barney 1991). Learning processes are 
generally assumed to be quasi-automatic and the literature does not question why 
organizational members would identify problems and engage in learning (Huber 1991; 
Morgan 1997), or why actors would wish to share information (Hargadon and Sutton 1997).  
 
Learning roles 
Attention has focused on the facilitation of learning through the performance of specific roles. 
Nonaka (1996) has identified three learning roles in knowledge-creating companies.  
Frontline employees create knowledge through their detailed know-how of particular 
technologies, products, or markets. Middle managers collect and examine information from 
different sources and build bridges between senior managers and frontline employees. Senior 
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managers provide the normative setting in which activities take place, designing standards 
and crafting strategies. 
Senge (1999) distinguishes three types of leadership roles in organizational learning and 
change. Local line leaders apply new ideas or practices and are accountable for direct results. 
Internal networkers or community builders are embedded in organization-wide 
communication networks.  They actively diffuse new solutions. The access of networkers to 
local and executive levels is important in creating an organization-wide basis for new ideas 
and practices. Executive leaders provide organizational space for learning and innovation, 
setting normative frames, providing moral support, guiding change processes, and allocating 
financial resources. 
Tushman and Nadler (1996) identify four roles critical to innovation as a learning 
process: idea generators, who combine technologies, markets, and products in creative ways 
and whose ideas constitute conceptual breakthroughs; internal entrepreneurs or champions, 
who apply these ideas to practical settings; boundary spanners or gatekeepers, who link 
(local) information and knowledge by translating and disseminating information throughout 
the organization; and sponsors or mentors, senior managers who stimulate and protect new 
ideas and provide the resources needed to develop innovations.  
These typologies suggest similar roles: bringing forward practical experience and/or 
responsibility for applying new knowledge; connecting pockets of knowledge, translating and 
disseminating knowledge through networks; and sponsoring or fostering knowledge creation 
by crafting strategies and allocating the necessary resources. In addition, Tushman and Nadler 
identify idea generators, which has no equivalent in other typologies. Similar roles have been 
identified in the development of knowledge and innovation for corporate environmental 
management, although this work carries the proviso that the systemic character of 
environmental issues requires engagement of a far wider range of internal and external actors, 
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with more divergent interests and motives than other areas of practice. This, in turn, requires 
well-developed capabilities to connect actors in collaboration (Roome 2001). 
In this study, we adopted Tushman and Nadler’s typology of idea generators, internal 
entrepreneurs, boundary spanners, and sponsors. These roles in the learning process connect 
with the stages in organizational learning identified earlier. Knowledge is obtained through 
inferential learning or reflection of (internal or external) idea generators and the experiential 
learning of internal entrepreneurs. Knowledge is accumulated – across and within the 
organisation’s boundaries – through vicarious learning by boundary spanners, which they or 
others then disseminate. This is stored in the technology, architecture, or routines used in the 
organization. Sponsors provide the space and resources to foster this process. 
Different resources underlie various types of power: operational power is the ability of 
employees (not) to implement decisions (Clegg 1989; Pfeffer 1992; Valley and Thompson 
1998); informational power stems from the possession of valuable knowledge (Burt 1998; 
DiMaggio and Powell 1983; French and Raven 1968; Messick and Ohme 1998); economic 
power relates to financial or other economic resources (French and Raven 1968; Mintzberg 
1983; Mitchell et al. 1997; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978); and social power is based on social 
norms and values (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; French and Raven 1968; Messick and Ohme 
1998; Mitchell et al. 1997). An uneven distribution of resources leads to a mix of influential 
and less influential actors (Hardy and Phillips 1998; Mintzberg 1983; Oliver 1990; Pfeffer 
and Salancik 1978; Phillips et al. 2000).  
Apart from the work by Contu and Willmott (2003), Coopey (1996), and Romme 
(1999), the literature on learning assumes that stakeholders have power sufficient to perform 
their roles. Where the effects of power are considered, this tends to focus on actors within 
organizations with at least some sense of common organizational purpose. In the case of 
corporate environmental management and its systemic character, a wider set of stakeholders 
                                                              
 12
are potentially involved in contributing to learning within companies. Our empirical study 




Our study was based on case studies of two major companies based in the Netherlands. The 
case study method enabled us to address questions of ‘why’ and ‘how’ (Yin 1994).  It also 
provides a basis for identifying, interrelating, and contextualizing multiple conjunctural causal 
factors (March 1979; Ragin 1987) and enables observation of the dynamics of unfolding 
processes (Simon 1991). These characteristics were important given our investigation focused 
on learning as process evolving through the interaction of a variety of actors. 
The companies produced physical goods, in the chemical industry and the food sector. 
They are referred to as Chemical and Food to warrant anonymity. The companies were 
selected because they were regarded by outside commentators as environmentally proactive 
organizations. We expected to find evidence of relatively advanced corporate environmental 
management practices, stakeholder engagement, and accompanying learning processes. The 
companies operated in different sectors and had different environmental objectives. Access 
was made possible through members of the Management Team (MT) of each company.  They 
were asked to identify the central actors (i.e., the persons who play a pivotal role in the 
management of corporate environmental issues). At Chemical, this was the head of the staff 
department Environment, Safety, and Health (ESH); at Food, it was the corporate 
environmental coordinator. At Chemical, we analysed the whole company. At Food, the 
analytical unit was the corporation. 
The metaphor of organizational learning is a difficult construct to operationalize. In 
directly productive settings, learning can be assessed by charting progress on a ‘learning 
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curve’ (Argote 1999). Similarly, innovation can be measured in terms of patents or new 
products brought to market. However, learning in corporate environmental management 
involves many actors and has many possible manifestations, and our focal organizations 
operated in different industries and faced different environmental challenges. Learning as 
performance was, therefore, related to the environmental objectives set out by each company 
in their mission statement. At Chemical, this was environmental performance beyond 
regulative compliance, and we studied the company’s compliance record and activities that 
were not required by law. Food’s mission was environmental sustainability, which we studied 
in terms of environmental measures by the company as well as the organization’s quantified 
performance regarding different aspects of sustainability.  
The construct of power was operationalized by determining which internal and external 
stakeholders were perceived as important by the central actors in each company (Pfeffer and 
Salancik 1978), using a scale ranging from ‘slightly’ to ‘very’ important. We assessed the 
nature of the resources (such as formal authority, information, or implementation capacity) of 
these stakeholders, together with the demands they expressed or expectations they held, and 
the focal organizations’ responsiveness to these demands and expectations.  
Data sources involved interviews, secondary sources, and field impressions. Semi-
structured interviews where held with the central actors to identify critical stakeholders and 
gain a qualitative guide to the nature and strength of the influence of these stakeholders in 
shaping company decisions with regard to the management of environmental issues. A 
‘snowballing’ (Simon and Burstein 1985) or ‘names generators’ (Angot and Josserand 1999) 
method identified the network of major internal and external stakeholders. The most 
influential stakeholders were then interviewed using semi-structured interviews to find out 
how they characterized their relationships with the central actors. Interviews with the different 
stakeholders allowed for source triangulation by comparing statements from different 
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respondents (Miles and Huberman 1994; Yin 1994). This was supported by a search of 
documentary and other information.  
In total, 11 persons were interviewed in the Chemical case: the 2 central actors, 4 other 
internal stakeholders, and 5 external stakeholders; 8 persons were interviewed in the Food 
case: the central actor, 4 other internal stakeholders, and 3 external stakeholders. Interviews 
ranged from 0.75 to 2.5 hours. If possible, interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed. 
Reports not tape-recorded were sent to the interviewees for verification.  
Secondary sources included annual financial reports, annual environmental reports, 
annual overviews of activities, government policies, periodicals, public relations brochures, 
an environmental covenant between government and industry, and organization charts. In 
total, 34 documents were used for Chemical and 27 for Food. Visits were made to the 
production sites of both organizations. The interview reports and other information were 
analysed by the researchers involved. The case descriptions are reported in the following 
sections. Unless indicated otherwise, these relate to the situation in 1999. 
 
Corporate Environmental Management and Stakeholders 
In this section, we describe the background to each company, the corporate environmental 
management structure, and the main internal and external stakeholders – highlighted in italics 
– identified by the central actors at both companies.  
 
Chemical’s Environmental Management Practices and Internal Stakeholders 
Chemical was founded by a publicly owned non-European parent company several decades 
ago. In the Netherlands, 1,500 employees manufacture chemical products, mainly for the 
consumer market but also for professional purposes. Chemicals are sourced from all over the 
world and used to produce a small range of final products. Chemical located in the 
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Netherlands in order to take advantage of the quality of a natural-resource input critical to its 
production processes. Several physically and organizationally separate production lines are 
situated at the site. Each production line manufactures relatively homogeneous products. The 
production lines share common functions, including purchasing, marketing, personnel, 
engineering, research, and environment, safety, and health. Virtually all of Chemical’s 
products are marketed outside the Netherlands.  
Chemical was obliged to acquire ISO 14001, the standard environmental management 
system (EMS), by its parent company to ensure compliance with environmental regulations, 
support continued improvement in environmental performance, and satisfy present and future 
expectations. All departments are affected by certification. Chemical’s ambition is to exceed 
regulatory compliance, although the company first wants to secure regulatory compliance and 
ensure its economic viability. This ambition is shared throughout the company. Chemical 
wants to be seen as a clean company, without major environmental problems.   
After initially failing to acquire ISO certification, the company employed the help of a 
consultancy firm. The certified EMS includes performance targets that are reasonably 
achievable. Chemical follows its parent company’s highly formalized organizational structure 
and strong attention to risk minimization. It has an extensive set of manuals specifying 
environmental procedures and protocols. Chemical is party to several environmental 
covenants that bind it to negotiated environmental targets agreed with the government, 
including one involving the national chemical industry.  
------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
Chemical’s environmental management structure is shown in Figure 1. The MT has 
extensive formal power and is headed by a non-Dutch representative of the parent company. 
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Other MT members represent functional areas, such as a production unit, personnel, and 
engineering. The MT sets environmental objectives, which focus on critical environmental 
themes, such as noise, effluent water, and solid waste.  
The engineering department controls the ESH staff section, which provides 
environmental advice to the MT. The head of ESH and the company’s environmental 
coordinator acquire and filter information from external environmental contacts and internal 
sources. The company has a closed – or at least controlled – position towards the outside 
world. Most employees have no direct external contacts. In communications, ESH 
representatives express a preference for certainties (for example, unambiguous permits, even 
though this might decrease the company’s room for manoeuvre). ESH scans external 
environmental information and issues relevant to the company. They closely monitor 
developing and new legislation through governmental publications and periodicals of trade 
and employers’ associations. They participate in a forum involving organizations in the same 
industrial zone, municipal officers, local politicians, and environmental staff from other 
chemical companies. 
Theme-oriented standing committees act on environmental objectives formulated by the 
MT.  Each committee is chaired by an MT representative (perceived as very important by the 
central actor), and involves an ESH representative and delegates from all departments 
concerned with the environmental theme at hand (regarded as quite important). The 
committees formulate operational plans, which are guided by the use of a stakeholder-
weighing technique, devised for the company by consultants.  
The relevant operating departments implement operational plans. Departmental 
coordinators, backed by their departmental heads, communicate operational plans to each 
section (i.e., subdepartment) head. Section heads routinely appoint ‘problem owners’, 
responsible for resolving specific operational problems. Problem owners come together in ad-
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hoc project groups drawn from one or several departments.  They have the required expertise 
to realize the operational objectives set by the standing committees. These ad-hoc groups 
reflect on possible solutions, which tend to be based on previously acquired experiences or 
drawn from other parts of the organization. The most favoured solutions and their financial 
implications are communicated to the standing committee for approval. Once approval has 
been granted, resources are allocated to realize the solutions. 
Activities required by the formal EMS are organized through similar routines. All of 
Chemical’s environment-related processes are consistent with the expectations of its parent 
company for clear, formal structures and routines based on extensive documentation and 
intensive internal communication to identify problems, exchange knowledge, ideas, and 
solutions, and allocate resources. 
Chemical has implemented many technical changes for environmental reasons. These 
include an extensive registration of the substances it uses, changes in its production process to 
substitute toxic substances, and more sparing use of the natural resource on which it relies.  
Chemical has a record of good housekeeping, application of total energy management, use of 
a biological air purification filter, in-house pre-processing of effluent water, prevention and 
recycling of solid waste, and acoustic insulation. Chemical’s overall environmental 
performance has improved progressively, in some areas sharply. Over the last few years, the 
company’s air emissions, solid waste, and effluent water have decreased, while its energy 
efficiency has improved. Compliance with environmental regulations is ensured in all areas, 
with occasional and minor exceptions. 
 
Chemical’s External Stakeholders 
Chemical’s major external stakeholders are set out in Table 1. This table identifies external 
environmental stakeholders and the basis for their interaction with the company as seen by the 
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central actors, together with the stakeholders’ perception of this interaction. Chemical regards 
local governmental bodies and other local regulators as its most important external 
stakeholders. Their importance stems from Chemical’s commitment to comply with 
prevailing regulations set out in four separate permits, pertaining to air emissions, effluent 
water, solid waste, noise, energy efficiency, and the use of a critical natural resource. Local 
authorities use the ALARA (as-low-as-reasonably-achievable) principle, in order to avoid 
costly measures that challenge existing business. Permits are reviewed periodically and have 
become increasingly stringent with regard to resource efficiency and maximum emission 
levels. Local regulators argue that Chemical makes significant claims on their time and wants 
to rule out any uncertainty that a new environmental permit might engender. This leads to 
greater regulative security, yet reduces the company’s room to manoeuvre or innovate with 
new environmental practices. Once a new permit has been obtained, Chemical tends to 
interpret it in its own way without further communication with the regulator. Some emissions 
also involve significant government-imposed charges, which vary with the level of emission. 
Chemical seeks to reduce emissions and charges through internal technical measures, for 
example, by pre-processing effluent water. Representatives of the local government and other 
regulators (such as the Water Board) indicate that Chemical generally complies well with its 
regulations.  They regard Chemical as a well-performing company. 
----------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
----------------------------- 
Chemical recently became a member of the national chemical trade association, which 
it regards as a slightly important stakeholder. The association was a party to the 1993 
chemical industry covenant, which set voluntary emission-reduction objectives between the 
industry and the national government. The association oversees the covenant and exerts 
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pressure on companies to ensure their contribution to industry-wide performance. Chemical 
complies with the covenant. The company is an active member of several of the trade 
association’s working groups, which exchange information on ‘best practices’ for pollution 
prevention and emission control. The trade association’s network also gives advice on 
company-specific technical, legal, or organizational problems.  
The aims of the – quite important – national employers’ association are to align the 
objectives and positions of Dutch employers, regardless of the industry, on nationally relevant 
issues such as tax reforms with environmental implications. The national association is party 
to several environmental covenants, including packaging and energy bench-marking. 
Chemical is an active member of this association: it has joined national covenant schemes and 
participates in several working groups. Environmental information is exchanged through the 
association’s member network.    
 
Food’s Environmental Management Practices and Internal Stakeholders 
A Dutch family established Food a century ago. Members of the original family are the main 
shareholders. The company manufactures and markets branded food products to domestic 
consumers. Food has more than 20 subsidiaries on 4 continents. The corporate headquarters 
and several subsidiaries are based in the Netherlands. Food recently took over a number of 
other food companies. It employs over 1,000 people in the Netherlands and twice this number 
in other countries.  
Food has a strong environmental commitment inspired by its present CEO, a member of 
the owning family. The commitment to environmental sustainability is defined as the absence 
of or compensation for the company’s (negative) environmental impacts. This is a core 
corporate value. Food aims to achieve this ambition by the year 2005. A number of 
individuals in top and middle management actively foster this sustainability value. They have 
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to motivate a larger majority of benevolent but passive employees to embrace this value, 
while taking account of a small resistant minority. While employees in all departments and 
positions accept environmental concerns, the sustainability ambition is not evenly shared 
throughout the organization. The highest commitment is at the top of the organization rather 
than at the operational level. Support from staff positions is more active than in line functions, 
and the offices are more intensely involved than the factories. 
The commitment to environmental sustainability and its ‘stretch targets’, together with 
some real environmental improvements, has given the outside world an excellent image of 
Food’s environmental position. The company is very open to contacts with a range of external 
interests. These are maintained at different levels. There is an openness to communicate 
externally throughout the organization. Communications are informal, with numerous face-to-
face meetings, while there is little use of documentation. 
 
------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------ 
Food’s corporate environmental management structure is shown in Figure 2. The 
corporate MT is the highest decision-making authority. The CEO is regarded as a crucial 
actor.  He is the company’s foremost environmental champion, admired for his value-driven 
leadership by many internal and external constituencies. He is strongly motivated by a 
personal, religiously inspired commitment to nature conservation. Environmental 
sustainability was explicitly incorporated into the company’s mission statement as a core 
value on his insistence. The CEO regularly launches strategic environmental initiatives and 
uses his formal power to create new staff functions to support the environmental ambition. 
Other members of Food’s MT have charge of functional domains (such as manufacturing and 
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human resources) and geographical areas (such as Europe and the Americas). The MT 
determines corporate strategies, including the one for the environment. 
The corporate environmental coordinator and two assistants advise the corporate MT. 
They take initiatives to promote the company’s environmental values in a uniform way. The 
coordinator’s work is steered by the CEO to ensure consistent messages. The corporate 
environmental coordinator has excellent external contacts with national government, 
environmental pressure groups, and universities. He has been actively involved in strategic 
issues, such as the conception of a company-wide EMS and reflections on the significance of 
corporate environmental sustainability for the company. A technical support unit is in charge 
of setting corporate environmental standards, contributing to environmentally benign 
solutions, and setting up a company-wide environmental database. Corporate technical staff 
members are considered to be slightly important. 
Food’s subsidiaries operate worldwide. The corporate environmental coordinator has 
regular contacts with subsidiaries in order to communicate corporate objectives. Performance-
related pay for the company’s general managers is partly dependent on environmental 
performance. General managers are in charge of implementing corporate strategies. They 
delegate environmental affairs to subsidiary environmental coordinators, who are regarded as 
quite important. They carry out this activity in addition to their ‘ordinary’ production-related 
tasks. Subsidiary environmental coordinators are in charge of operational contacts with local 
government regulators needed to obtain environmental permits. They also lead environmental 
project groups, which consist of representatives of the functional areas of the subsidiary 
involved, a member of the corporate technical staff, and an outside consultant. At present, 
environmental initiatives are taken on an ad-hoc basis. The project groups are not (yet) fully 
operational because they face competing time claims, especially to meet short-term 
production targets. The envisaged modus operandi of environmental project groups is to 
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brainstorm problems defined higher up in the organization. Proposed solutions are then based 
on experiences elsewhere in the subsidiary, in other subsidiaries of Food, or outside the 
company (through the input of outside consultants). The best ideas that come forward are 
explored in greater detail, and – if retained – submitted to higher levels for financial 
endorsement.  
Food operates a quality management system to the standard of ISO 9000. It intends to 
set up a formal EMS (such as ISO 14001) along the same lines. The current absence of a 
formal system is consistent with the non-systematic approach towards environmental issues at 
Food and the founding family’s attitude towards organising the business as a whole. The lack 
of such a system and the limited human resources for environmental management are also 
partly related to the adverse market conditions in some markets in which Food operates. 
Food has undertaken a number of significant internal environmental initiatives. These 
include installation of solar panels and wind turbines, purification and recycling of effluent 
water, use of surface water for cooling purposes, a green office plan (including the use of 
recycled paper and LPG for company-owned cars), separation and recycling of solid waste, 
use of thinner packaging materials, and promotion of environmental awareness. The company 
is engaged in reforestation projects to compensate for its carbon dioxide emissions. On the 
other hand, Food has a high waste production rate, and its housekeeping leaves considerable 
room for improvement.  
Food uses an assessment system to measure its environmental performance in line with 
its ambition for environmental sustainability. This is based on quantitative yardsticks for 
issues such as carbon dioxide emissions, acidification, water consumption, effluent water, and 
solid waste. These yardsticks measure the performance at every subsidiary. The assessment 
system was developed for Food by external consultants.  Over the last decade, Food’s 
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aggregate environmental impact measured by this tool has fallen by 50 percent, though the 
company is still a long way from its own target of zero impact by 2005. 
 
Food’s external stakeholders 
Food’s most significant external environmental stakeholders identified by the central actor are 
represented in Table 2. Food regards the national government as a very important stakeholder 
because it sets the Dutch national environmental policy and standards. Food wants to maintain 
good communication with the government, as it sees shares an interest to bring about a 
transition to sustainable development. Food views this as a partnership through which the 
company and government can learn. For example, the company participates in a government-
business platform that addresses the concept of industrial environmental sustainability. This 
platform has regular, open brainstorming sessions, in which participants from different 
industries try to translate the notion of sustainability into their respective business contexts. 
Food sees this as a very important way to obtain new concepts and ideas. A representative of 
the national government indicates that Food is a particularly proactive company in its work 
and its involvement with the platform. 
 
 ----------------------------- 
 Insert Table 2 about here 
 ----------------------------- 
 
In its supply-chain, Food perceives the transport companies it contracts as slightly 
important because of the contribution of product distribution to the overall environmental 
impact of Food’s products. Transport companies are not only involved in distribution, but also 
in storage and order picking. Food sees many possibilities to bring about environmental and 
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economic gains through improved logistics. Food’s environmental ambitions are 
acknowledged by a major carrier, who nevertheless indicates that distribution is driven by 
logistical considerations and the need to ensure product availability at sales outlets. This can 
lead to partial truck loads of products.  
Food sees environmental pressure groups as having slight importance. Their role as 
custodians of social interests and values and potential to generate negative publicity through 
campaigns is recognised. Food maintains open relations with a variety of environmental 
pressure groups and contributes financially to their projects. Yet, the company regards these 
groups as reactive and lacking creative ideas about innovative business practices. These 
groups do not contribute to the implementation of Food’s sustainability objective. Indeed, a 
regional environmental group considers Food to be an absolute front-runner in environmental 
sustainability, an example to business as a whole. 
 
Discussion 
Comparison of the two companies is complicated by the fact that Chemical was analysed at 
the company level, whereas Food was observed at the corporate level. Nevertheless, the cases 
provide evidence of the complex relationship between organizational learning and stakeholder 
power. We follow the structure of the earlier theoretical section to discuss our findings on 
multi-stakeholder cooperation and learning spaces as well as different aspects of 
organizational learning (types, processes, and roles). 
  
Multi-Stakeholder Cooperation and Learning Spaces  
Chemical’s objective of environmental performance beyond regulative compliance leads it to 
measure its performance against precise targets, set on the basis of regulatory standards from 
the local authorities – after consultation with company representatives – and beyond-
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compliance targets determined by the MT. Internal and external stakeholders do not question 
these targets once they are set. New environmental targets are brought forward through 
routine procedures, which meet the parent company’s ambition to control for environmental 
risk. Standing, theme-oriented committees, consisting of representatives from different 
organizational levels and departments, agree upon the best ways to operationalize the strategic 
targets. When these committees have reached agreement, they are implemented in the 
different departments, where ‘problem owners’ are appointed to meet further environmental 
challenges. Outcomes are fed back to standing committees to enable information sharing with 
other departments. When internal solutions cannot be found, Chemical turns to external 
working groups of the chemical and national trade associations. Some external stakeholders 
criticize Chemical for a perceived lack of communication, but all agree that the company is 
proactive and acts beyond compliance. Chemical recognizes the systemic nature of 
environmental issues and operates established routines through which the interests of different 
stakeholders are channelled. There is a relatively high degree of cooperation among 
stakeholders, whose inputs are required to realize the corporate environmental mission. This 
has led to good performance within a tightly defined framework. 
Food’s ambition to become an environmentally sustainable business is conceptually 
clear. This objective was not formulated under external pressure, but is the CEO’s personal 
conviction and has been adopted by Food’s MT. While top-management commitment to this 
ambition exists, it is not uniformly shared at lower levels, especially in production units. This 
lack of commitment can be explained by a perceived lack of necessity and the conflict 
between priorities. Food is searching for ways to translate its ambition into reality. While it 
has clear (stretch) targets, it lacks the means to achieve them. The CEO has taken the lead to 
constitute a corporate staff group to search for solutions that meet the company’s 
environmental objective, but the organization lacks an acknowledged, routine corporate 
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environmental management structure. Working groups are not institutionalised and convene 
on an ad-hoc basis. Consequently, there is a lack of routines for sharing information and 
coordinating actions. One external stakeholder contributes to the achievement of industrial 
sustainability by sharing knowledge at an advanced level, but the company does not actively 
cooperate by learning explicitly with other outside actors. Stakeholders are vested with power 
as a result of the company’s ambition. Yet, this ambition is hampered by the lack of a routine 
structure through which to implement change. This can be understood against the (historical) 
backdrop of the attitude of the owning family towards conducting business. While Food has 
made important progress towards achieving sustainable business, it lacks sufficient common 
ground and cooperation to resolve certain environmental challenges, including high waste 
production. These findings suggest that convergence of stakeholder interests is crucial in 
effective learning and action. Divergent interests among (internal) actors has been addressed 
in the literature (Cohen et al. 1979; Cyert and March 1992; Hickson et al. 1986; Mintzberg 
1983; Schein 1996), as has the necessity of securing the resources provided by crucial 
(external) actors (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) and the need to achieve cooperative platforms 
(Glasbergen 1998; Gray 1989; Hajer 1996; Hart 1995; Roome 1994; Sharma and Vredenburg 
1998; Turcotte and Pasquero 2001; Westley and Vredenburg 1991). Yet, the literature has too 
easily assumed that convergence of stakeholders’ interests can be attained. Moreover, the 
possibility that stakeholder power is influenced by company ambition and routine has not 
been addressed. 
 
Organizational Learning at Chemical and Food 
Learning at Chemical focuses on performance beyond regulatory compliance, although this 
ambition is pursued within existing frames of reference. Environmental initiatives involve the 
adaptation of existing practices, through efficiency measures, good housekeeping, total 
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energy management, and pre-processing of effluent water. The company is engaged in 
exploitative learning. 
Chemical’s environmental management is highly structured, with well-established 
routines, extensive written communication, and frequent official meetings. Its parent company 
considers such a structure as the key to risk management and continuous improvement. 
Strategic decisions of the MT are affected through similar routines. Internal stakeholders are 
committed to these routines and cooperate willingly. External relations are also highly 
structured. Membership of working groups of chemical and national trade associations is 
largely geared towards obtaining operational information through established structures.  
Learning at Food centres on environmental sustainability. The company has made 
important progress over the last decade through efficiency-related measures (including fewer 
packaging materials and recycling of effluent water) and highly visible initiatives (such as the 
generation of renewable electricity and reforestation projects). Yet, the company realizes that 
present gains in performance will not meet its zero-environmental-impact objective for 2005. 
Food searches for conceptual insights outside existing frames, particularly through its contacts 
with the national government and companies in other industries. The company learns 
exploratively. 
Food’s environmental management is relatively loosely structured. Strategic decisions 
are communicated to lower levels, to be implemented according to their own insights. There 
are no company-wide committees or working groups to operationalize strategic decisions. 
Food does not have a formal management system or routinized approach, because the family 
owners adopted a relatively informal approach in their running of the company. Initiatives 
tend to be ad-hoc. There is no company-wide commitment to established environmental 
targets, and a certain degree of resistance or indifference is encountered, especially at 
operational levels. Food has regular contacts with the national government, but not with other 
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external stakeholders. The company does not seek to structure or control outside contacts, 
which are often informal in nature.  
With respect to learning roles, these are well defined at Chemical. The MT fulfils a 
sponsor role, establishing proactive objectives, setting up theme-oriented committees, and 
providing ample financial, technical, and human resources to implement environmental 
targets. The ESH department uses routines to provide a boundary-spanning capability. Project 
groups act as internal entrepreneurs. Ideas are generated by this group but within conventional 
frames, consistent with the exploitative nature of Chemical’s learning. Learning roles rely less 
on individuals and more on routines and surrounding team structure. 
At Food, the CEO acts as a sponsor through his moral and formal support. The 
corporate environmental coordinator takes on the role of boundary spanner through his 
contacts with external stakeholders and his function as information broker between the 
corporate and subsidiary levels. The external platform set up by the government acts as an 
idea generator, providing innovative ideas about the concept of corporate environmental 
sustainability. The role of internal entrepreneur was less clear. At Food, learning roles rely 
strongly on individuals and operate within a rather ad-hoc management structure.   
Nonaka (1996), Senge (1999), and Tushman and Nadler (1996) agree that learning roles 
should be well connected. The routines at Chemical provide this connection, whereas it is 
based more on interpersonal networks at Food. Apart from this interconnectedness, power is 
also important. The stakeholders that fulfil major learning roles all have power bases (such as 
formal authority, knowledge, and implementation capacity) to which others are sensitive. 
Learning appears effective if actors playing critical roles have the power necessary for these 
roles, as evidenced by Chemical. If the power base of stakeholders is weak or if critical actors 
use their power to resist, learning is hampered. These aspects are insufficiently addressed in 
the literature. 
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Our findings suggest that Chemical’s highly formalized routines are compatible with 
exploitative learning. By contrast, Food’s loose management structure is positively related to 
explorative learning. This difference seems to stem from the ambitions set for environmental 
management in each company. These outcomes indicate how organizational ambitions affect 
the type of organizational learning, and the power and motivation of stakeholders. All its 
major, powerful stakeholders support Chemical’s exploitative learning. Food’s ambition and 
stretch targets support explorative learning, which meets with resistance at operational levels. 
Learning is not initiated and performed quasi-automatically, as assumed in the literature 
(Huber 1991; Morgan 1997). While the importance of shared norms and commitment is 
recognised (Hargadon and Sutton 1997; Senge 1990), learning is contingent on the 
willingness of critical actors to contribute their knowledge. Interestingly, Food’s ambition has 
vested some stakeholders with greater influence and failed to motivate others to engage, 
through their indifference or conflicting priorities. 
 
Types of Learning and Stakeholder Power 
One of the key observations of our study was that the two case companies engaged in 
fundamentally different types of learning for power-related reasons. The literature identified 
previously discusses the relationship between learning types – exploitative and explorative – 
and organizational structures. Exploitative learning arises within tightly coupled relationships, 
where routinised learning occurs with established actors, whereas explorative learning occurs 
in more loosely coupled networks of dissimilar actors (Burns and Stalker 1961; Hansen et al. 
2001; Rowley et al. 2000; Weick and Westley 1996). However, the literature says little about 
why type of learning and stakeholder power interact. 
The learning types and organizational structures found at Chemical and Food conform 
to theory. Chemical engages in exploitative learning and it has a highly formal and closed 
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organizational system to identify and prioritise stakeholders. The company interacts with key 
environmental stakeholders, scanning for emerging environmental issues, and initiating 
responses in a structured way; it thereby draws mainly on internal sources. This is based on 
explicit routines and controlled responses. Stakeholder inputs converge around the 
establishment of environmental demands on the company, while the search for solutions to 
improve the company’s environmental performance is progressive, incremental, and mainly 
internal. Food, by contrast, has an explorative learning style. It lacks a stringent hierarchy for 
control and is relatively porous to inputs and ideas. In its environmental work, Food connects 
to a system of informal, loose relationships with a diverse set of stakeholders. It engages in 
these external networks to pick up novel and innovative ideas that are required to meet its 
ambitious strategic target of environmental sustainability. Internally, Food does not have a 
formalised management system or structure through which environmental learning is 
developed, transmitted, and acted on. There is significant divergence among stakeholders: a 
constellation of senior managers and some external stakeholders strives for environmental 
sustainability; other external stakeholders play a marginal role, while internal operational 
units seek to maintain local operating performance. 
Chemical’s exploitative learning stems from the power of the – publicly owned – parent 
company and its business philosophy, where a commitment to environmental goals is part of 
risk management. This power is exercised through the parent company’s representative as 
chair of the MT, as well as the requirement to have in place an environmental management 
system with ISO 14000 certification and routines that coordinate responses to key external 
stakeholder demands. At the operational level, actors wield their informational and 
operational power in concert to implement the strategic objectives set. Environmental learning 
and performance are subordinated to Chemical’s economic objectives and operations. 
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Food’s explorative learning is driven by the CEO, who – on behalf of the owning family 
– uses his extensive formal power to promote the ambition of environmental sustainability.  
This ambition has high importance at the corporate level. There is wide recognition that it 
cannot be accomplished within the existing business model and requires knowledge from 
outside the sector to be combined with internal knowledge in order to affect change. This 
approach vests innovative, external stakeholders with significant informational power over 
the development of new practices within the company. The outcomes of this explorative 
learning process are, however, broadly disconnected from concerns at the operational level, 
where stakeholders direct their operational power towards primary production targets. This is 
exacerbated by the absence of an established environmental management system or routines 
that provide for the exchange of ideas between operational and strategic levels. While the 
ambition of the company empowers some stakeholders, the lack of a routinized system 
disempowers the contribution of many internal stakeholders and undermines the overall 
attainment of the environmental ambition Food has set. This leads to the view that 
stakeholders with the power to determine an organization’s ambition and to establish routines 
have a remarkably strong impact on the power of other stakeholders and significantly affect 
the type of learning that ensues.    
 
Conclusions 
We have considered stakeholder power and organizational learning in the context of corporate 
environmental management practices. Our aim was to examine how and why learning types, 
processes, and roles relate to the distribution of power among stakeholders. We based our 
observations on case studies of two companies. Our evidence shows that one company, 
Chemical, had a risk management perspective, a highly structured, routinized environmental 
management approach and was involved in exploitative learning.  This was driven and 
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supported by its parent company and internal MT. Ample resources were devoted to gaining 
new insights leading to environmental performance beyond compliance. It had well-
articulated learning roles, a framework to assess stakeholder interests, and used stakeholder 
demands as a spur to internal problem solving. The company’s environmental ambition and 
approach to risk, together with its stakeholder-weighing system, were used to identify key 
external stakeholders, whose inputs contributed to the definition of problems. Chemical then 
mainly used internal stakeholders as a source of knowledge and ideas to identify solutions to 
these problems; it allocated resources needed to adapt its operations to meet these problems. 
External stakeholders had power as problem setters but were given, or took, little power in 
contributing ideas or knowledge to help solve those problems. When solutions could not be 
found internally, external working groups of national associations were addressed. In terms of 
roles, problems were defined externally while the internal routines and structures for learning 
provided a framework through which roles of idea generation, internal entrepreneurship, 
boundary spanning, and sponsorship were performed. The routine structure gave power to 
individuals to perform roles, and the structure linked these roles together to permit effective, 
exploitative learning. 
Food had higher environmental ambitions and a values-based approach, with a more 
loosely structured environmental management system in which individuals assumed 
significance. The CEO and his family actively fostered Food’s explorative learning. Market 
conditions and production priorities meant that resources were not readily available to support 
these ambitions. Nevertheless, the company’s stretch targets led to a search for new insights. 
The company had less well-articulated learning roles, no framework to assess stakeholder 
interests, and used its stretch targets and ambition as a spur to learning and innovation.  Food 
took an informal approach based on personal networks to identify which external stakeholders 
and platforms might provide it with learning spaces. The widespread recognition of the 
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company’s high ambition, and its relations with external stakeholders, served to forestall 
(formal or social) power of some stakeholders and elevate the (informational) power of 
others. Food used external and internal stakeholders as a source of knowledge and ideas, 
allocating the resources needed to meet their own internal targets. Central actors had power as 
problem setters, but weakness in internal structures and routines meant that solutions were 
more difficult to implement because of resistance arising from lack of commitment or 
conflicting priorities. In terms of roles, idea generators were internal and external, while 
internal entrepreneurship, boundary spanning, and sponsorship were very much personalized 
and lacked the support of a routine system.  
The findings of our study support the claim that power is an important factor in the 
theory and practice of organizational learning and stakeholder engagement, especially in 
connection with corporate environmental management. However, our study suggests that 
power is far from absolute: in part it is possessed by stakeholders, in part it is vested by 
organizations involved in learning or stakeholder engagement, and in part it is determined by 
the ambition of organizations and the type of learning and relationships they have with other 
actors. It is clear that an alignment of powerful interests is supportive of exploitative learning 
and the implementation of such learning. Explorative learning does not require an alignment 
of interests up to the point where it is necessary to implement the results of learning. 
However, it does require commitment of those with ideas and knowledge to come together in 
learning spaces and the capacity or cognitive power of individual actors to recognize the 
potential of the ideas generated in those spaces. Certainly, we observed that the power (or 
influence) to fulfil roles crucial to learning is important but that power can come from many 
sources: personal skills, knowledge and networks, formal authority, and operational capacity; 
these sources turned out to be different in the two case companies. It is interesting to 
speculate how power might affect organizations involved simultaneously in explorative and 
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exploitative learning and the ability to learn how to learn.  These areas appear increasingly 
critical in organizations that face the issue of how to redefine their role and position in 
society. We see this as a fruitful area for future research. 
In general, theories of multi-stakeholder cooperation and organizational learning have 
tended to ignore the crucial issue of power. However, to address power and influence 
adequately in these contexts and to develop an appreciation of how and why stakeholder 
influence might affect organizational learning, we need to view the processes of learning in 
their full complexity. Our study suggests that power is important, but its importance is 
contextual and shapes learning and stakeholder engagement not simply in direct and 
immediate ways but through complex systems involving multiple causalities. Our evidence 
pertains to environmental management practices. We anticipate that similar findings will hold 
in other settings that are characterized by systemic complexity. 
The only precondition we can set is that future studies of organizational learning and 
stakeholder engagement should place greater emphasis on the potential impact of stakeholder 
power. Moreover, the design of these studies should take into account the nature of mutual 
causalities affecting the interactions between stakeholder power and organizational learning, 
mediated through factors such as organizational ambitions, routines, networks, institutional 
contexts, and personal attributes (including personal vision, leadership, and skills).   
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Table 1   Chemical’s External Environmental Stakeholders 
 




Local regulators  
 
 
 Permit to exploit the 
natural resource used 
in its processes 
 Permit for noise 
 Permit for air 
emissions, solid waste, 
and energy efficiency 
 Permit for effluent 
water 





to its own 
interpretation 
 Chemical makes 
excessive claims 
on their time, yet  
creates too rigid a 
structure for itself 







influenced by the 
level of levies on 
waste 
 Permit obtention 
requires intensive 
consultations 
with government  
Chemical trade 
association  
 Head of ESH is a 
member of several of 
the association’s 
working groups 
 Chemical is 
regarded as a 
recent and active 
member 















 Head of ESH is  a 
member of several of 
the association’s 
working groups 
 Chemical is a 
good, active 
member 
 The purpose of 
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Table 2   Food’s External Environmental Stakeholders 
 






















 Ideas are 
exchanged in an 
open atmosphere 
 Outcomes are not 
directly 
applicable 








 Food initiates 
new ideas, but 
transporters are 





awareness of  
sustainability 
issues 
 Donation of Food 
to NGO projects 
 Food is 
recognized for its 
environmental 
leadership 
 Food maintains 
this relation to 
maintain a good 
public image, not 
to learn from the 
NGOs 
 
 
